American Association of People with Disabilities, et al.:
The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) argues the following in its brief in support of the United States. First, that “the experience of the states demonstrates that ensuring coverage for persons with pre-existing medical conditions has worked only with a complementary requirement that persons who can afford it carry health insurance.” In support, it argues that “state bans on excluding from coverage people with pre-existing conditions that were not accompanied by a minimum coverage provision have been unsuccessful,” and that “Massachusetts successfully banned excluding from insurance plans patients with pre-existing conditions by requiring minimum coverage.”
Second, the AAPD argues that “individuals who choose to forego insurance shift billions of dollars of costs to other participants in the health insurance and services market.”
Finally, the AAPD argues that “the minimum coverage provision, together with the prohibition on exclusions for pre-existing conditions, can be expected to reduce health care costs, prevent medical bankruptcies, encourage fluidity in the job market, and eliminate the economic costs from unnecessary deaths.” In support of this claim, the AAPD writes that (1) “the pre-existing conditions will reduce health care costs for millions of American, (2) that “the pre-existing conditions provision will reduce medical expenses,” (3) that “the pre-existing conditions provision will reduce ‘job lock,’” and (4) that “the pre-existing conditions provision will reduce preventable deaths.”
American Nurses Association, et al.:
Here, the amici’s brief argues the following in support of the ACA’s constitutionality. First, that “the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact provisions that are reasonably adapted to making a broader regulatory scheme effective,” because (1) “the Necessary and Proper Power is broad,” and (2) “the Necessary and Proper Power is neither coextensive with the Commerce Power nor bound entirely by Gonzales v. Raich.”
Second, that “the minimum coverage provision is ‘reasonably adapted’ to Congress’s legitimate ends of regulating interstate commerce in the health market and ensuring that federal health care spending is not wasted.” According to amici, this is so because removing the minimum coverage provision would “drive up the costs of care for the uninsured and shift these costs to persons with insurance,” and would “drastically reduce[] the value of the ACA’s subsidies,” thus imperiling the national insurance market. Also, they argue that “a decision upholding the minimum coverage provision would not justify the hypothetical federal laws suggested by the district court.”
Constitutional Law Professors:
The Constitutional Law Professors make three arguments in their brief supporting the United States. First, they argue that “the Taxing Power is a broad and independent grant of legislative power.” Because of this, they argue that “Congress may enact taxes that have the effect of regulating activities not subject to regulation under Congress’s other enumerated powers.” Thus, “a tax is constitutional if it (1) serves the general welfare, (2) is reasonably related to revenue raising, and (3) does not infringe any constitutionally-protected individual right.”
Second, they argue that “the minimum coverage fee provision is a valid exercise of the Tax Power,” because (1) it “satisfies the requirements for exercise of the Taxation Power,” and (2) “the Taxation Clause does not require Congress to use any particular labels or expressly invoke the taxation power.”
Finally, they argue that “the minimum coverage fee provision is not a direct tax subject to the constitutional requirement of apportionment,” because (1) “the apportionment requirement applies only to capitation taxes and taxes on property,” and (2) “the minimum coverage fee provision is neither a capitation tax nor a tax on property.”
Economic Scholars:
The Economic Scholars argue the following in support of the United States. First, they argue that “the unique economics of the health care industry make the minimum coverage provision necessary,” because: (1) “people cannot avoid medical care with certainty, or be sure that they can pay for the costs of care if uninsured”; (2) there is other legislation that “mandates access to a minimum level of health care for all who seek it, even those who cannot pay”; and (3) “whether one person buys health insurance has cost implications for everyone else.”
Second, they argue that “upholding Section 1501 will not give Congress unfettered power to impose new mandates on individuals,” because (1) “health care characteristics distinguish it from other markets,” (2) the “decision to forego health care is not a passive decision,” and “the decision to forego health care insurance directly affects interstate commerce.”
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts argues the following in support of the United Stats. First, that “the experience of Massachusetts confirms that Congress had a rational basis to determine that free-riding, taken in aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” Thus, “Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to impose the minimum coverage requirement.” Second, that “because eliminating free-riders is, at a minimum, rationally related to successful implementation of other components of [the] federal healthcare law, Congress also had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose the minimum coverage requirement.”
Missouri Attorney General:
General Koster argues the following in his amicus brief. First, he argues that “the Founding Fathers and the Supreme Court have uniformly rejected a generalized police power.”
Second, he argues that “the Commerce Clause is not a federal police power permitting Congress to force individual citizens to act.” He writes that “although the Commerce Clause broadly reaches ‘activities’ that substantially affect interstate commerce, an individual’s neglect or refusal to act is not an activity,” because “the ‘most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority,’ Wickard v. Filburn, involved only activities, not inactivity,” and “the law at issue in Gonzales v. Raich also penalized only activities, not inactivity or doing nothing.” He argues that “if doing nothing constitutes ‘activities’ subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause becomes a generalized police power,” because “the definitions of ‘commerce’ and ‘activity’ do not include the decision to do nothing,” and “allowing Congress to penalize, under the Commerce Clause, a decision to do nothing is a dramatic and unsupported expansion of its authority.” Furthermore, he writes that “the power to require individual citizens to act to protect health is [a] quintessentially state police power.”
Finally, in regard to the severability issue, General Koster argues that “severance of the individual mandate from the ACA is appropriate to preserve the valid remaining provisions.”
The National Indian Health Board, et al.:
Here, amici argue limit their argument to the severability issue. Specifically, amici argue that “the history of Congress’s Indian health care legislation demonstrates that the IHCIA and other Indian-specific provisions of the ACA are entirely separate from the individual mandate provision of the ACA.” Amici write that “the Indian health care system is separate and distinct from the insurance-based system, and thus 10221 and the other Indian-specific ACA provisions are separable from the individual mandate and should remain valid.”
Second, that “Section 10221 of the ACA, reauthorizing and amending the IHCIA and other Indian-specific provisions in the Act, are all separable from the individual mandate provision held unconstitutional by the district court.” Amici argue that “the court erred by concluding that the entire ACA is connected to the individual mandate rather than viewing the ACA as a collection of diverse laws,” and “the court erred by according too much significance to the lack of a severability clause.”
Oregon, California, Iowa, Delaware, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, Hawai'i, Vermont, and the District of Columbia:
Here, amici argue the following in support of the United States. Regarding the Commerce Clause, amici argue that “Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the ACA’s minimum coverage provision.” They write that “in articulating Congress’s regulatory authority, the Supreme Court has never distinguished between ‘activity’ and ‘inactivity,’ nor does that distinction provide a workable framework for analysis.” Furthermore, amici write that “the minimum coverage provision is constitutional because Congress had a rational basis for concluding that choosing to forgo health insurance substantially affects interstate commerce.” Finally, amici argue that “the minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it is an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”
Amici also argue that Congress “has the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact the ACA’s minimum coverage provision,” because (1) it “is a necessary means to a legitimate end,” (2) and it is “a ‘proper’ exercise of Congressional authority that does not encroach on state sovereignty.”
Finally, amici argue that “the minimum coverage provision is severable from the remainder of the Affordable Care Act.”
Senator Reid and Representative Pelosi, et al.:
Senator Reid and his fellow amici argue the following in their brief. First, in regard to the Commerce Clause issue, they argue that the Act, “including its minimum coverage requirement, is a valid exercise of Congress’s enumerated constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several states.” They write that “Congress has plenary authority to regulate interstate markets, including matters affecting the prices of commodities traded in interstate commerce.” Thus, they argue that “the Act, of which the minimum coverage requirement is an integral part, is a constitutional regulation of interstate commerce,” because (1) the Commerce Clause authorizes the minimum coverage requirement as congressional regulation of the national health insurance market,” and “the minimum coverage requirement is fully consistent with limits on the Commerce Clause described in recent Supreme Court decisions.” Finally, they argue that there “is no constitutional basis for carving out a novel exception to Congress’s recognized power to regulate interstate commerce.” In support, they write that activity/inactivity distinction is “irrelevant to the question of the Act’s constitutionality,” and that the “Appellees’ proposed distinction between activity and inactivity rests on a discredited substantive due process theory of economic liberty that is not cognizable in a legal action challenging a federal statute on Article I grounds.”
Second, in regard to Necessary and Proper Clause, amici argue that “Congress also has power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to adopt the minimum coverage requirement as a means Congress deems appropriate and conducive to accomplish the ends” of the Act. Amici write that “the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to choose the means best suited in its judgment to execute its express powers, as long as the means are conducive to a constitutionally legitimate legislative end.” Thus, they conclude, “the minimum coverage provision is an appropriate means of executing the Act’s regulation of the interstate health care insurance market, is plainly adopted to the end of assuring affordable health care for all Americans, and violates no constitutional prohibition.”
State Legislators:
The State Legislators make two principle arguments in their brief in supporting the United States. First, they argue that “the Framers wrote the Constitution to give the federal government legislative power to address national concerns, while preserving the states’ ability to act in matters that do not require a national response.” They write that “the Framers included the Commerce Clause in the Constitution to allow the federal government to legislate affairs among the several states that require a federal response,” and that “under the text and the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has discretion to employ legislative means naturally related to the lawful objects or ends of the federal government.”
Second, they argue that “the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion is constitutional and respects principles of Federalism.”
Professor Kevin Walsh:
Professor Walsh argues the following in support of neither party. First, he argues that “this court should determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists over the Plaintiff states’ claim against the individual mandate.”
Second, Professor Walsh argues that “the Plaintiff states’ challenge to the individual mandate is outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,” because (1) “states may not sue the federal government as Parens Patriae to protect their citizens from the individual mandate,” (2) there “is not statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over the state’s challenge to the individual mandate,” and (3) “the state’s challenge to the individual mandate presents no Article III case or controversy.’
Finally, Professor Walsh argues that “the Plaintiff states cannot create jurisdiction by asserting inseverability.”
